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ABSTRACT. When people agree to disagree, how the disagreement among agents
impact on the market is the main concern of this paper. With the standard mean
variance framework, this paper considers a market of two risky assets and two agents
who have different preference and biased beliefs in the mean and variance/covariance
of the asset returns. By constructing a consensus belief, the paper develops an concept
of boundedly rational equilibrium (BRE) to characterize the market equilibrium and
examines explicitly the impact of heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and risk
premium when the disagreements among the two agents are mean preserved spreads
of a benchmark homogeneoue belief. It shows that, in market equilibrium, the biased
mean preserved spreads in beliefs among the two agents have significant impact on
the risk premium of the risky assets and market portfolio, and adding a riskless asset
in the market magnifies the impact of the heterogeneity on the market. The results
show that both optimism/pessemism and confidence/doubt can increase the market
risk premium and reduce the riskfree rate.
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1. INTRODUCTION
To better explain market anomalies, puzzles and various market phenomena, eco-
nomics and finance are witnessing an important paradigm shift, from a representative,
rational agent approach towards a behavioral, agent-based approach in which econ-
omy and markets are populated with bounded rational agents who have heterogeneous
beliefs. When the heterogeneity in beliefs is not due to asymmetric information but
rather to intrinsic differences in how to view the world, people agree to disagree. The
heterogeneity in beliefs among agents are very often characterized by notions of opti-
mism and pessimism, overconfidence and doubt. Literatures have made a significant
contribution to the understanding of the market aggregation when agents differ on
their expectations and the impact of heterogeneous beliefs amongst investors on mar-
ket equilibrium, see, for example, Lintner (1969), Rubinstein (1976), Williams (1977),
Abel (1989, 2002), Detemple and Murthy (1994), Zapatero (1998)), and more recently
Calvet, Grandmont and Lemaire (2004), Wenzelburger (2004), Bo¨hm and Chiarella
(2005), Bo¨hm and Wenzelburger (2005), Jouni and Napp (2006), Sharpe (2007), Gol-
lier (2007), Chiarella, Deici and He (2006, 2009) and Horst and Wenzelburger (2008).
The notion of overconfidence has been explored in finance literature (see, e.g., De-
Long, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990), Kyle and Wang (1997), and Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998)). Several empirical studies of professionals’
economic forecasts and psychological surveys indicate that agents have optimism and
overconfidence1 about their own (relative) abilities (see, e.g., Rabin (1998), Hirshleifer
(2001), and Giordani and Soderlind (2006)). One of the driving forces for the de-
velopment of the literature in heterogeneous beliefs is to explain equity premium and
risk-free rate puzzles (see Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Weil (1989)), to which sev-
eral theoretic explanation have been proposed recently. For example, Barberis, Huang
and Santos (2001) adopt a non-standard utility function, motivated by prospect the-
ory; Benartzi and Thaler (1995) consider myopic loss aversion. Deviating from ratio-
nal expectation in the standard neoclassical paradigm, when beliefs are exogenously
given, it has been found (see, e.g., Detemple and Murthy (1994), Abel (2002), Calvet
et al. (2004), Jouini and Napp (2006), and Gollier (2007)) that a pessimistic bias and
1As elaborated in Hvide (2002), experimental psychologic literature have applied, somewhat confus-
ingly, two distinct meanings of the term ‘overconfidence’, overconfidence1 and overconfidence2 (called
in Hvide (2002)). In the stock market, overconfidence1 relates to a skewed first moment of a subjec-
tive probability distribution, while overconfidence2 relates to a skewed second moment of a subjec-
tive probability distribution. There is no clear relation between overconfidence1 and overconfidence2
since they reflect different underlying phenomena. In Abel (2002), a uniform pessimism is defined as
(the subjective distribution being) a leftward translation of the objective distribution, doubt as a mean-
preserving spread of the objective distribution. To avoid confusion, in our discussion, we adopt the
notions of Abel (2002) and refer overconfidence1 and overconfidence2 to optimism and overconfidence,
respectively. The confidence in DeLong et al. (1990) and Kyle and Wang (1997) is actually referred to
overconfidence2.
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doubt in the subjective distribution of the growth rate of consumption and a positive
correlation between risk tolerance and pessimism (doubt) leads to an increase of the
market price of risk. To discipline the heterogeneity in beliefs and to understand how
agents form their beliefs differently, in a static Nash equilibrium (see Kyle (1989)) set
up of two agents model when agents hold incorrect but strategic beliefs, Jouini and
Napp (2009) provide a discipline for belief formation through a model of subjective
beliefs in order to provide a rationale for belief heterogeneity. They find that optimism
(overconfidence) as well as pessemism (doubt) emerge as optimal beliefs of agents’
strategic behaviour and there is a positive correlation between pessimism (doubt) and
risk tolerance. This strategic explanation of heterogeneous beliefs is in contrast with
rational approach to beliefs where agents try to reflect the ‘world as it is’ in their be-
liefs, and with approach in which forward-looking agents optimally distort beliefs and
in which beliefs are of intrinsic value to agents, as with wishful thinking or fear of
disappointment (see Brunnermeier and Parker (2005)).
By introducing a concept of pragmatic beliefs, Hvide (2002) uses a simple game-
theoretic example of a job market and shows optimism can be the equilibrium outcome
if agents form beliefs pragmatically. The main justification for programmatic beliefs
is dynamics in the sense that, without awareness about their own optimism, agents
are gradually learning that a certain way of forming beliefs is more rewarding than
other ways. Also, by quantifying the amount of pessimism and doubt in survey data
on US consumption and income, Giordani and Soderlind (2006) find some evidence of
pessimism, but individual forecasters clearly exhibit overconfidence rather than doubt.
By showing that the average distribution shows no statistically significant sign of either
overconfidence or doubt, they conclude that doubt is not a promising explanation of
the equity premium puzzle and the amount of pessimism provides only a rather small
improvement in the empirical performance of the model.
The above literature shows that there appears an inconsistency between the theo-
retic and empirical (or experimental) results, illustrating the complicated impact of the
heterogeneity in beliefs. This indicates a need to examine the complicated impact of
the heterogeneity on the market explicitly. To this need, in this paper, we consider a
simple financial market with two risky assets, one risk-free asset, and two agents who
have different preferences and biased beliefs. Both agents have homogeneous beliefs
in the return for one of the risky assets, but have biased beliefs in the return of the
other asset. The heterogeneity of agents is characterized by their difference in risk
tolerance, the expected returns, the standard deviations and, in particular, the corre-
lation of the two asset returns, which has not been examined in the literature since
most of them consider the situation of only one risky asset. The biased beliefs are
assumed to be mean preserved spreads of a benchmark homogeneous belief. By as-
suming that agents maximize a primitive utility function (see Sharpe (1991) and Levy
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and Markowitz (1979)), agents choose their optimal portfolios based on their beliefs.
By constructing a consensus belief, the market equilibrium is characterized by the con-
sensus belief. Different from the standard rational expectation equilibrium, the market
equilibrium under the consensus belief reflects the bounded rationality of the agents
in the sense that the market equilibrium is achieved when agents make their optimal
decision based on their subjective beliefs. We call such equilibrium as a boundedly ra-
tional equilibrium. We show that the different aspects of the biased beliefs, including
the optimism/pessemism and confidence/doubt, can have different impact on the mar-
ket equilibrium. In particular, the biased beliefs in return correlation have significantly
impact on the equilibrium market equity premium and risk-free rate.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we set up the economy and describe
the aggregation problem when agents have heterogeneous preferences and beliefs. We
show how the different risk tolerance and heterogeneous beliefs can be aggregated
through a consensus belief in market equilibrium. In particular, we derive a CAPM
under heterogeneous beliefs. In Section 3, as a benchmark of our analysis, we include
the traditional CAPM under the homogeneous belief in terms of market portfolio, the
equilibrium risk-free rate and market risk premium and illustrate the equity premium
and risk-free rate puzzles. In Section 4, by introducing biased risk preference and
biased beliefs among two agents, we examine the impact of the heterogeneity on the
market equilibrium risk-free rate and market premium explicitly. In particular, we
explore the conditions in explanting the risk-free rate and equity premium puzzles.
Finally, some concluding remarks are presented in Section 5.
2. THE HETEROGENEOUS BELIEFS AND BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM
2.1. The Economy. We consider a two-date economy2 in which there are two risky
assets, indexed by j = 1, 2 and two agents, indexed by i = 1, 2. Assume agents have
different preferences. Asset j(j = 1, 2) offers investors a end-of-period return of r˜j .
The joint probability distribution of the returns of the two assets are assumed to be
jointly normal but unknown to the agents. This implies that, based on the same in-
formation set, agents have heterogeneous beliefs in the expected returns and variance-













be his/her beliefs in the means and covariance matrix, respectively, where
µi,j = 1 + Ei(r˜j), σ2i,j = V ari(r˜j), ρi = Correli(r˜1, r˜2)
2The discussion and results of this section for the general economy of many risky assets and many
heterogeneous beliefs can be found in He and Shi (2009).
BOUNDEDLY RATIONAL EQUILIBRIUM AND RISK PREMIUM 5
for i, j = 1, 2. We use Bi := (µi,1, µi,2, σi,1, σi,2, ρi) to denote the beliefs of agent i.
2.2. Optimal Portfolio Problem. Agent i’s terminal wealth is W˜i = Wi0(piTi 1 + r˜j),
where pii = (pii,1, pii,2)T is the vector of portfolio weights (proportion of wealth in-
vested in each asset). We assume that investors maximize a primitive utility func-
tion Ui(pi) = piTi µi − 12τipiTi Vipii under the budget constraint is 1Tpii = 1, where
1 = (1, 1)T and τi is the risk-tolerance that measures the marginal rate of substitution
of variance for expected return. This utility function has been used in Sharpe (1991), it
is consistent with Markowitz portfolio selection criterion and also serves as a good ap-
proximation for other type of utility functions, see Levy and Markowitz (1979). Solv-




i (µi − λ∗i1), λ∗i =
1TV −1i µi − 1/τi
1TV −1i 1
, (2.1)
where λ∗i measures the marginal certainty equivalent rate of return (CER) per one
percent investment in each asset. In the case when there exists a risk-free security with
a certain future payoff Rf = 1 + rf , the CER of agents becomes Rf and the optimal
portfolio can be simplified to
pi∗i = τiV
−1
i (µi −Rf1). (2.2)
2.3. Consensus Belief and Boundedly Rational Equilibrium. We characterize mar-
ket equilibrium by the concept of a consensus belief developed in Chiarella, Dieci and
He (2006) with a riskfree asset and He and Shi (2009) without riskfree asset. Essen-
tially, the consensus belief reflects the aggregation of the heterogeneous beliefs when
the market is in equilibrium. It helps us to understand how heterogeneity or biases in
agents’ beliefs can affect the endogenous variables derived from market equilibrium
such as the market risk premium, risk-free rate and market volatility.
Definition 2.1. A belief Ba = (µa,1, µa,2, σa,1, σa,2, ρa) is called a market consensus
belief of the two agent economy if the equilibrium price vector of the risky assets (and
the risk-free rate when there exists a risk-free asset) under the heterogeneous beliefs
Bi := (µi,1, µi,2, σi,1, σi,2, ρi) (i = 1, 2) is also the market equilibrium price vector of
the risky assets (and the risk-free rate) under the homogeneous belief Ba.
In the following, we show that such consensus belief for the economy with hetero-
geneous beliefs can be constructed. Let Wi0 be the initial wealth of agent i (i = 1, 2).
Then W0 = W10 + W20 corresponds to the total market wealth. Define the market
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becomes
pi∗1 w1 + pi
∗
2 w2 = pim,
where pim denotes the market portfolio of risky assets. Since the market equilibrium
is obtained based on the fact that both agents make their optimal portfolio decision
under their subjective beliefs, rather than the objective belief, we call such equilibrium
as Boundedly Rational Equilibrium (BRE). The following result characterizes such
BRE.
Proposition 2.2. Let





































(ii) the equilibrium market portfolio is determined by
pim = τaV
−1
a (µa − λ∗a1); (2.5)
(iii) the Zero-beta CAPM relation
Ea[r˜]− (λ∗a − 1)1 = β[Ea(r˜m)− (λa − 1)], (2.6)
holds under the consensus belief Ba, where
β = (β1, β2)
T , βj =
Cova(r˜m, r˜j)
σ2a(r˜m)
, j = 1, 2.
Proposition 2.2 can be proved similarly to the proof of Proposition 5.1 in He and
Shi (2009). Based on Proposition 2.2, we have the following observations. (i) The
risk tolerance of the market is a weighted average of that of the two agents weighted
by the corresponding wealth fraction of the agents. Note that the wealth weighted
risk tolerance wiτi(i = 1, 2) also appears in the consensus beliefs defined in (2.3) and
(2.4). Therefore, if we can treat wiτi(i = 1, 2) as a risk tolerance, this implies the
assumption that wealthier investors are more risk tolerant. (ii) The consensus belief of
the variance/covariance matrix can be treated as a harmonic mean of agents’ subjective
beliefs weighted by their wealth weighted risk-tolerance and CER. Hence a more risk-
tolerant investor with a higher CER will dominate the consensus belief and hence
the market. (iii) The consensus belief of expected asset returns is also an average of
investors’ subjective beliefs weighted by their wealth weighted risk-tolerance and the
inverse of their covariance matrices.
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In general, the impact of different risk tolerance and heterogeneous beliefs of agents
can have a very complicated impact, in particular, the marginal certainty equivalent rate
of return λ∗i for investor i can be different. However, if there exist a risk-free security,
then λ∗i = Rf for all i in equations (2.3) and (2.4). In this case, by assuming that
the risk-free asset is in zero-net supply in market equilibrium, we obtain the following
Corollary.
Corollary 2.3. If there exist a risk-free security with return of Rf = 1 + rf , then the























the market portfolio becomes
pim = τaV
−1
a (Ea(r˜)− rf1); (2.9)
the equilibrium CAPM relation becomes
Ea[r˜]− rf1 = β[Ea(r˜m)− rf ], (2.10)
and the equilibrium risk-free rate is given by
rf =
1TV −1a Ea(r˜)− 1τa
1TV −1a 1
. (2.11)
A similar result to Corollary 2.3 for many assets and beliefs can be found in Chiarella,
Dieci and He (2009) and He and Shi (2009). The impact of the heterogeneity on the
market equilibrium, CAPM relation, market equity premium, and risk free rate can be
complicated in general. By focusing on the case of two assets and two agents in this
paper, we are able to examine explicitly the impact in Section 4. To compare with the
traditional CAPM, we first consider the homogeneous belief as the benchmark case in
the next section.
3. A BENCHMARK CASE UNDER HOMOGENEOUS BELIEF
To examine the impact of the heterogeneity on the market equilibrium and compare
with the market equilibrium under a homogeneous belief, we consider in this section
a benchmark case under the standard rational expectation in which both agents may
have different risk tolerance, but have the same beliefs in returns.3, denoted by Bo =
(µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ), that is Bi = Bo for i = 1, 2. In this benchmark case, we have from
3The benchmark beliefs Bo can be treated as either the objective belief or a benchmark homogeneous
belief.






















τa(µ1 − µ2) + σ2(σ2 − ρσ1)
τa(µ2 − µ1) + σ1(σ1 − ρσ2
)
. (3.1)
When there exists a risk-free asset, the market risk-premium, risk-free return and mar-
ket variance are given, respectively, by
Eˆ(r˜m − rf ) := (µ1 − µ2)































It is easy to see that τa = σˆ2(r˜m)/Eˆ(r˜m − rf ), so the market risk-tolerance represents
the marginal rate of substitution between market risk premium and market variance.
Weil (1989) attributes the risk premium puzzle and the risk-free rate puzzle to two
distinction basic empirical facts about the aggregate consumption process. Essentially,
under the representative agent framework, on the one hand, there is not enough in-
dividual consumption risk, so if agents are only moderately risk-averse, the observed
risk premium is too high. On the other hand, the average rate of growth of individual
consumption is too high and to explain the observed low risk-free rate, agents need
to be extremely averse to intertemporal substitution. Within the simple economy con-
sidered in this paper, we show that similar puzzles can still arise in the homogeneous
benchmark case when asset returns are correlated and the asset with a higher expected
future return is also much more risky. To illustrate this, we consider the following
numerical example.
Example 3.1. Let the two risky assets in the economy have expected returns (µ1, µ2) =
(1.06, 1.09) and standard deviations (σ1, σ2) = (0.08, 0.3) and correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.8. Both investors hold the benchmark belief, that is, Bi = Bo = (µ1, µ2, σ1, σ2, ρ).
For simplicity, we also assume that each investor has half of the aggregate market ini-
tial wealth (so that w1 = w2 = 1/2)4.
We choose τi = 0.5 (i = 1, 2), which is a reasonable level of risk-tolerance. Note
that τa = σˆ2(r˜m)/Eˆ(r˜m − rf ), this implies that the market in equilibrium requires 2%
4Alternatively, we can treat wiτi as the risk tolerance of agent i and argue that wealthier agents are more
risk tolerant. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, we also assume that w1 = w2 = 1/2.
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expected excess return (above the risk-free rate) for 10% standard deviation. Conse-
quently, we have from equations (3.1) and (3.2) that the market portfolio is given by
pim = (0.962, 0.038)
T and
τa = 0.5, rˆf = 4.62%, Eˆ(r˜m − rf ) = 1.49%, and σˆm = 8.63%.
Clearly with τi = τa = 0.5, the risk-free rate is too high, the risk-premium and market
volatility are too low. We can certainly increase the risk-premium and reduce the
risk-free rate by decreasing τa, however this leads to some absurd implications. For
example, we could choose τa = 0.1, then
rˆf = 0%, Eˆ(r˜m − rf ) = 6%, and σˆm = 8%.
In this case, the market portfolio becomes pim = (1, 0)T (asset 2 is redundant), also
the market requires 10% expected excess return for 10% standard deviation which does
not seem reasonable. This simple example illustrates the equity premium and risk-free
puzzles under the homogeneous belief in the literature.
4. THE IMPACT OF HETEROGENEITY
In order to explore the impact of heterogeneity in investors’ belief on the market
equilibrium, in particular, the risk-premium and the risk-free rate, we assume that there
is a risk-free asset in most of our analysis in this section. However, the case when there
is no risk-free asset will be examined later. To examine the impact explicitly, we as-
sume that agents agree about the first risky asset (which might be well informed) but
disagree about the expected return, standard deviation of the second asset (which is
less informed) and the correlation coefficient of the returns of the two assets. The dis-
agreements are characterized by mean-preserved spread about the benchmark belief.
That is, the beliefs in the expected return and the standard deviation of the first asset
for both agents are given by the benchmark beliefs: (σi,1, µi,1) = (σ1, µ1) for i = 1, 2,
while the risk tolerance and the beliefs of the two agents in the expected return and
standard deviation of the second asset, and the return correlation of the two assets are
mean-preserved spread of the benchmark belief. More precisely, we assume that the
risk-tolerances of the two agents are given, respectively, by
τ1 = τo(1−∆), τ2 = τo(1 + ∆), ∆ ∈ (−1, 1);
the beliefs about the standard deviation of asset 2 are given by
σ1,2 = σ2(1− δ), σ2,2 = σ2(1 + δ), δ ∈ (−1, 1);
the beliefs about the correlation between asset returns are given by
ρ1 = ρ(1− ε), ρ2 = ρ(1 + ε), ε ∈ (−1, 1);
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and the beliefs of expected returns of asset 2 are given by
µ1,2 = µ2(1− α), µ2,2 = µ2(1 + α), α ∈ (−1, 1).
The mean-preserved spreads imply that the average risk-tolerance and belief in this
heterogeneous economy is exactly the same as the benchmark homogeneous economy.
However, the consensus belief may not be same as the benchmark belief. As the result,
the market portfolio, market risk-premium, risk-free rate and the market volatility may
also differ from the homogeneous benchmark economy. For this setup, the different
aspects of the heterogeneity are characterized by ∆, δ, ε and α. To examine the joint
impact of risk tolerance, optimism/pessism, and confidence/doubt on the market, we
consider four combinations of these parameters in the following.
4.1. Case 1: Impact of Risk Tolerance and Optimism/Pessimism. We first consider
the case where the two agents have different risk-tolerance and heterogeneous belief
regarding the expected future return of asset 2, that is
δ = 0, ε = 0, ∆ ∈ (−1, 1), α ∈ (−1, 1). (4.1)
This means that agent1 is less (more) risk tolerance than agent 2 when ∆ > 0(<
0) and agent 1 is more pessimistic (optimistic) than agent 2 when α > 0(< 0). In
particular, when ∆α > 0(< 0), the risk tolerance and optimism of the two agents
are positively (negatively) correlated, meaning that the more risk-tolerant investor is
optimistic, while the less risk-tolerant investor is pessimistic, about future asset return.
Applying Corollary 2.3 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.1. For the case (4.1), the consensus belief is given by
τa = τo, Va = Vo, µa = (µ1, µ2(1 + α∆))
T . (4.2)
Consequently,
(i) the change in market portfolio is given by
pim − pˆim = α∆ τoµ2






(ii) the change in risk-premium is given by
(E(r˜m)− rf )− (Eˆ(r˜m)− rˆf ) = α∆µ2σ1(ρσ2 − σ1) + τo(µ2 − µ1)
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
; (4.4)
(iii) the change in risk-free rate is given by
rˆf − rf = α∆σ1µ2 ρσ2 − σ1
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
; (4.5)
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(iv) the change in market volatility is given by
σ2m − σˆ2m = α∆τ 2oµ2
(µ2 − µ1) + (µ2(1 + α∆)− µ1)
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
; (4.6)
(v) the changes in the beta coefficients are given by
β1 = βˆ1 + α∆µ2τo
ρσ2 − σ1
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
,
β2 = βˆ2 + α∆µ2τo
σ2 − ρσ1
σ21 − 2ρσ1σ2 + σ22
. (4.7)
where (βˆ1, βˆ2)T = Vopˆim/σˆ2m are the asset betas under the homogeneous
benchmark case.
Corollary 4.1 characterize explicitly the impact of the heterogeneity on the market.
It is easy to see that if either both the agents have the same risk preference (so that
∆ = 0) or they have the same benchmark belief in the expected return of both assets
(so that α = 0), then α∆ = 0 and the results for the heterogeneous beliefs are reduced
to that for the benchmark homogeneous case. The impact of the heterogeneity in this
case (4.1) depends on the sign of α∆ and the return correlation ρ in the benchmark
belief. Corollary 4.1 leads to following three implications.
Firstly, when risk-tolerance and optimism about future returns are positively (nega-
tively) correlated, that is α∆ > (<)0, it follows from (4.2) that the aggregate market is
optimistic (pessimistic) about the expected return of the second asset. Consequently,
the aggregate market, indicated by the market portfolio in (4.3), invests more (less)
into asset 2 and less (more) into asset 1 and that the market volatility measured by σm
is high (low) following (4.5). This observation that the market becomes pessimistic
when the risk tolerance and pessimism are positively correlated is also found in Jouini
and Napp (2006).
Secondly, comparing with the benchmark belief case, we have from (4.4) that the
market with biased beliefs among the two agents increase the market risk-premium
when either
α∆ > 0 and µ2 − µ1 > σ1(σ1 − ρσ2)/τo (4.8)
or
α∆ < 0 and µ2 − µ1 < σ1(σ1 − ρσ2)/τo. (4.9)
Similarly, from (4.5), the risk-free rate under the biased belief is reduced when either
α∆ > 0 and ρ > σ1/σ2, (4.10)
or
α∆ < 0 and ρ < σ1/σ2. (4.11)
In other words, when either (i) the risk tolerance and optimism of agent are posi-
tively correlated, returns of the two assets are highly positively correlated (so that ρ >
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σ1/σ2), and also the difference in asset expected returns are large enough (µ2 − µ1 >
σ1(σ1− ρσ2)/τo), or (ii) the risk tolerance and optimism of agent are negatively corre-
lated, returns of the two assets are less (even negatively) correlated (so that ρ < σ1/σ2),
and difference in asset expected returns are small enough (µ2−µ1 < σ1(σ1−ρσ2)/τo),
then the biased beliefs increase the market premium and reduce the risk-free rate. This
observation helps us to resolve the equity premium and risk-free rate puzzles. Within
the framework of heterogeneous beliefs, some literature (see, for example, Abel (2002)
and Jouini and Napp (2006)) explain the puzzles by arguing that it is sufficient when
the risk tolerance and pessimism are positively correlated. Our analysis shows that
both positive and negative correlations between the risk tolerance and pessimism can
explain the puzzles, depending on the return correlation. To our knowledge, the role
of the return correlation on the explanation of the puzzles has not been explored in the
literature and we will show that it plays a very important role towards the puzzles.
Thirdly, the standard CAPM relation under the benchmark belief is no longer held,
though the CAPM under the heterogeneous beliefs still holds under the consensus
belief. It is easy to see that, once the biases in the expected return disappear, the betas
become the standard betas under the benchmark belief. Under the biased beliefs, the
betas βj can be decomposed into the betas βˆj under the benchmark belief and a term
related to the biases in the beliefs, which becomes a risk factor under the heterogeneous
CAPM relation. As part of the βj , this risk factor related to the biased beliefs becomes
part of the systematic risk which is missing in the standard CAPM relation. However,
this risk factor can be either positive or negative for different asset. Comparing with
the benchmark case, β1 > βˆ1 under either condition (4.10) or condition (4.11), in other
words, β1 changes in the same direction as the risk-free rate. However, the change of
systematic risk for asset 2 has no clear relation with the change in risk-free rate, the
sign of β2 > βˆ2 depends on the terms α∆ and σ2 − ρσ1. For example, if asset 2 is
more risky and α∆ < 0, then heterogeneity can actually reduce the systematic risk of
the second asset.
To assess the exact impact, we now conduct a numerical analysis. Based on the nu-
merical values provided in Example 3.1, we show graphically in Figure 4.1 the impact
of heterogeneity in terms of α and ∆ on the change of market portfolio (in terms of
the second risky asset in the market portfolio) in Figure 4.1(a), the market volatility
in Figure 4.1(b), the expected market return in Figure 4.1(c), and the equilibrium risk-
free rate in market equilibrium in Figure 4.1(d). Note that we have ρ > σ1/σ2 for the
numerical values. It is clear that the plots are symmetric reflecting the fact the effect
of heterogeneity depends on the product α∆ rather than individually. We see in this
case that as the product α∆ gets larger, the market portfolio consists more of asset 2,
which leads to higher market return and volatility, at the same time the risk-free rate
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(a1) Market Proportion of asset 2 (a2) Market volatility
(a3) Risk premium (a4) Risk-free rate
FIGURE 4.1. Effect of heterogeneity in risk-tolerance ∆ and beliefs of
expected return α on the market proportion of asset 2, market volatility,
market risk-premium and the risk-free rate
reduces and the risk-premium increases. Also, the Sharpe ratio of the market portfo-
lio increases, which suggests that heterogeneity of α∆ improves the mean-variance
efficiency of the aggregate market.
To quantify the impact on the market, we base on the numerical values provided
in Example 3.1 and choose (∆, δ, ε, α) = (0.2, 0, 0, 0.1). The results are reported in
Table 4.1. Comparing with the benchmark homogeneous belief, the results for Case 1
in Table 4.1 show that heterogeneity in the risk tolerance and the expected return helps
to resolve the puzzles when α∆ > 0. However, the overall effect is not significant
for the chosen parameters. Risk premium increases moderately by 1% and the risk-
free rate is merely reduced by less than half of a percent. This is mainly because that
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Cases (∆, δ, ε, α) pim,2 σ(r˜m) E(r˜m − rf ) rf E(r˜m)−rfσm
Benchmark (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.038 8.63% 1.49% 4.62% 0.1727
Case 1 (0.2, 0, 0, 0.1) 0.2258 12.3% 2.54% 4.14% 0.2061
Case 2 (0,−0.2, 0, 0.1) 0.7511 24.15% 3.88% 4.37% 0.1606
Case 3 (0, 0, 0.2, 0.1) 0.5415 19.31% 5.69% 1.94% 0.2947
Case 4 (−0.2, 0.2, 0, 0.1) 0.1124 10.00% 1.77% 4.57% 0.1770
TABLE 4.1. Effects of heterogeneity on the market proportion of asset
2 (pim,2), market volatility (σ(r˜m)), market risk-premium (E(r˜m− rf )),
the risk-free rate (rf ) and the Sharpe ratio
E(r˜m)−rf
σm
for the three cases,
compared with the benchmark homogeneous case. Numerical values
for the benchmark belief and risk tolerance are given in Example 3.1.
the market becomes over-optimistic which offsets the increase in aggregate volatility,
although the market consists more of the riskier asset.
4.2. Case 2: The Impact of Optimism/Pessimism and Confidence/Doubt. In the
second case, we focus on the impact of the optimism/pessimism (measured by α) and
confidence/dobut (measured by δ) for asset 2 on the market in equilibrium by letting
∆ = 0, ε = 0. Measured by the beliefs in the standard deviation, agent 1 becomes
confident (doubt) when δ > 0. Applying Corollary 2.3 to this case, we obtain the
following result.
Corollary 4.2. For the second case when ∆ = 0, ε = 0 and δ, α ∈ (−1, 1), the
consensus belief Ba = (µa,1, µa,2, σa,1, σa,2, ρa) is given by τa = τo,
µa,1 = µ1 − αδµ2 ρσ1














1 + δ2 − ρ2
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Corollary 4.2 gives the explicit impact of the biased beliefs in the expected return
and the standard deviation for the second asset among the two agents. One special case
is very interesting. This is when there is unbiased beliefs in the standard deviation of
the second asset (that is δ = 0). In this case, we see from (4.12) and (4.13) that there
is no difference between the heterogeneous case with biased expected return on the
second asset and the benchmark unbiased case, so a biased beliefs in the expected
return of the asset 2 alone has no impact on the market. In general, based on (4.12)
and (4.13), we see that the biased beliefs in the expected returns of the asset 2 has
impact on the market expected return, but not the standard deviations and correlation.
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However, the biased beliefs on the standard deviation of the return of the asset 2 affects
the expected returns, standard deviation, and correlation of both assets when the asset
returns are correlated. This effect vanishes when ρ = 0. Corollary 4.2 reflects a
joint impact of the optimism/pessimism and confidence/dobut on the market. From
equations (4.13), one can see that the aggregate market becomes over-confident when
investors have biased beliefs regarding the variance of asset 2’s return so that, for
0 < δ < 1, σa,1 < σ1, σa,2 < σ2 and ρaσa,1σa,2 < ρσ1σ2. From (4.12), when αδ < 0,
that is when the optimistic (pessimistic) investor is confident (doubtful) about his/her
belief of the expected return of asset 2, the market perceives a higher expected return
for both assets.
To examine the impact on the market, we let δ = −0.2 and α = 0.1. This means
that the first (second) investor is optimistic (pessimistic) and confident (doubt) on the
expected return of the second asset, so that αδ < 0. In this case, the results in Table 4.1
show a dramatic increase in the market’s holding of asset 2, since it becomes the riskier
asset with a higher expected return. Therefore the market gains in risk-premium but
also becomes much more volatile. This is due to the fact that the increase in expected
return is much higher for asset 2 than for asset 1, since based on the numerics in
Example 3.1, the value of (ρσ1/σ2) is small relative to (2 − ρ2), see (4.12). The
risk-free rate reduces only slightly, because the market consists much more of the
riskier asset, but this is offset by the fact that market also becomes over-confident and
over-optimistic. This observation is consistent with the survey result in Giordani and
Soderlind (2006) that the doubt is not promising explanation of the equity premium
puzzle and the amount of pessimism provides only a rather small improvement. The
Sharpe ratio drops comparing the homogeneous benchmark case, suggesting that the
gain in risk premium cannot compensate for the higher volatility. Although not shown
here, a similar plot to Figure 4.1 can be done for this case, suggesting that the effect
on equilibrium quantities depend on the joint product αδ.
4.3. Case 3: The Impact of Optimism/Pessimism and Biased Belief in the Corre-
lation. In the third case, we examine the joint impact of heterogeneity in the expected
return of asset 2 and the correlation coefficient by letting ∆ = 0, δ = 0 and consider-
ing the effect of (ε, α). When ² > 0(< 0), agent 1 believes that the return correlation
is lower (higher) while agent 2 believes that the return correlation is higher (lower).
Applying Corollary 2.3 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.3. For the case that ∆ = 0, δ = 0 and ε, α ∈ (−1, 1), the consensus
belief Ba = (µa,1, µa,2, σa,1, σa,2, ρa) is given by τa = τo,
µa,1 = µ1 − αε ρσ1































Corollary 4.3 shows the impact of the optimism/pessimism and the biased beliefs
in the correlation on the market. Note that the biased beliefs in the expected return
of the asset 2 affect the market expected returns of both assets, not the variances and
covariance. However, the biased beliefs in the return correlation affect both the first
and second moments of the market returns of both assets as well as the return cor-
relation. It is easy to see that, for 0 < ε < 1, we have σa,1 < σ1, σa,2 < σ2 and
ρaσa,1σa,2 > ρσ1σ2. This indicates that in aggregate the market becomes more confi-
dent about the future returns of the both assets but perceives a higher return covariance
comparing to the benchmark case. For αε > 0, that is when the optimistic investor
also believes in higher correlation between asset returns, we see from equation (4.14)
that the market perceives a higher (lower) expected return for asset 2 (asset 1) when
ρ > 0 and vice versa when ρ < 0. Intuitively, when ρ > 0, this should lead the market
to invest more into asset 2. As the result, the aggregate market return and volatility in-
crease. However, different from the previous cases, there is less diversification effect,
according to (3.2), hence one should expect a significant reduction in the risk-free rate.
To examine the impact of the heterogeneity in the expected return and correlation,
we choose ² = 0.2 and α = 0.1 so that αε > 0. The results are given for Case 3 in
Table 4.1, showing the most desirable result to resolve the puzzles. The risk-free rate
in this case is reduced significantly by nearly 3% while the risk premium increased
significantly by more than 4%. Most noticeably, the Sharpe ratio in this case is 0.2497,
the highest amongst all cases including the homogeneous benchmark by far, implying
that the aggregate market becomes the most mean-variance efficient when αε > 0.
4.4. Case 4: The Impact of Risk-tolerance and Confidence/Doubt. In the fouth
case, we examine the joint impact of heterogeneity in the risk-tolerance (measure by
∆) and confident/doubt (measure by δ by letting α = 0 and ε = 0. Applying Corollary
2.3 to this case, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 4.4. For the case that α = 0, ε = 0 and ∆, δ ∈ (−1, 1), the consensus
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Corollary 4.4 shows the combined impact of the risk-tolerance and confidence/doubt
on the market is rather complicated. Note that, if δ = 0, that is there is no biased belief
in the standard deviation, the consensus belief is reduced to the benchmark belief.
Jouni and Napp (2006) argue that a positive correlation between risk tolerance and
doubt can help to resolve the puzzles. To illustrate the impact, we choose ∆ = −0.2
and δ = 0.2 so that δ∆ < 0, that is the more risk-tolerant agent is also doubtful.
We report the numerical results in Tab 4.1 for Case 4. We can see that the market risk
premium increases and risk-free rate reduces, but the magnitudes of the changes are not
very significant to resolve the puzzles. Consisting with the survey result in Giordani
and Soderlind (2006), this illustrates that doubt is not a promising explanation of the
equity premium puzzle.
4.5. Impact of the Existence of a Risk-free Asset. In all of the above cases, we
have assumed that there exists a risk-free security in the market, which is in net-
zero supply to allow investors borrow and lend at the risk-free rate. According to
equation (4.11) and (2.2), this implies that both investors have the same CER, that is
λ∗i = Rf for i = 1, 2. If there is no risk-free security in the economy, then obviously
investors would have different CER and the aggregate market’s CER is risk-tolerance
weighted average of investors’ CER. Note that when investors have common vari-
ance/covaraince matrices, then adding a risk-free security to the market would not
change the consensus belief or the market equilibrium. This is, when Vi = Vo, the
consensus belief of expected asset return are identical with or without a risk-free asset
and therefore we have
λ∗a = Rf =
1TV −1a µa − 1τa
1TV −1a 1
Hence, the aggregate market’s CER would not be affected by the existence of a risk-
free security which is in net-zero supply. However, this is no longer the case when
investor have different beliefs about the varaiance/covariances of asset return. Market
could arrive at a different equilibrium with or without a risk-free security.
To illustrate the impact of the existence of the risk-less asset, we consider the Case
3, which is the most promising case to resolve the puzzles, but assume that the market
does not have a risk-free asset. Because of the complexity, the impact is examined by
conducting numerical analysis.
In Figure (4.2) and Table 4.2, subscripts (f) is referring to the situation where there
exists a risk-free security in the market and subscript (z) is referring the case where no
risk-free borrowing or lending are allowed. Both Figure (4.2) and the numerical results
in Table (4.2) show that the existence of the risk-free magnifies the effect of hetero-
geneity on the market. Without the risk-free security, the market portfolio consists
much less of the riskier asset (asset 2). As the result, the CER, market expected return
and market volatility are all reduced significantly. Most importantly, the Sharpe ratio
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(d1) pi(f)m,2 − pi(z)m,2 (d2) Rf − λ∗a
(d3) E(f)(r˜m)− E(z)(r˜m) (d4) σ(f)m − σ(z)m
FIGURE 4.2. Impact of the existence of a risk-free security on the mar-
ket proportion of asset 2, CER, market expected and volatility
pi
(f)










0.3852 1.69% 1.16% 8.43% 0.0338
TABLE 4.2. Impact of the existence of a risk-free security on the mar-
ket proportion of asset 2 pi(f)m,2 − pi(z)m,2, CER Rf − λ∗a, market expected







also decreases5. Hence market can benefit from the existence of a risk-free security in
terms of mean-variance efficiency, although it is in net-zero supply. The intuition is
5In the case without a risk-free security, we use λ∗a − 1 which is the expected return of the minimum-
variance zero-beta portfolio under the consensus belief in calculating the Sharpe ratio.
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that, without a risk-free security, investors are restricted from taking positions to fully
reflect their beliefs. Thus, the effect of heterogeneity on market equilibrium is also
reduced.
4.6. Biased Beliefs in the “Safe” Stock. In the previous cases, agents are assume to
have disagreement over the distribution of the terminal return of the “risky” stock, in
the sense that the stock has a higher expected return and higher risk. The question is
that: what are the impact of the heterogeneous beliefs in the stock with lower expected
return and lower risk. We now consider this scenario in which agents have heteroge-
neous belief regarding distribution of terminal return of the “safe” asset, which has a
less uncertain terminal return with lower expected value in the benchmark belief. The
impact is illustrated by considering the following example.
Example 4.5. Let the two risky assets6 in the economy have expected returns (µ1, µ2) =
(1.09, 1.06) and standard deviations (σ1, σ2) = (0.3, 0.08) and correlation coefficient
ρ = 0.8. Agents have heterogeneous beliefs about terminal return of asset 2, and dif-
ferent risk tolerance. Their heterogeneity is characterized by parameters ∆, δ, ε and
α as described earlier in this section.
Cases (∆, δ, ε, α) pim,2 σ(r˜m) E(r˜m − rf ) rf E(r˜m)−rfσm
Benchmark (0, 0, 0, 0) 0.038 8.63% 1.49% 4.62% 0.1727
Case 1 (−0.2, 0, 0, 0.1) 0.2207 12.2% 4.63% 2.04% 0.3794
Case 2 (0, 0.2, 0, 0.1) 0.3854 12.99% 6.11% 1.04% 0.4710
Case 3 (0, 0,−0.2, 0.1) 0.2525 10.11% 1.87% 4.9% 0.1846
Case 4 (0.2, 0.2, 0, 0) 0.0637 9.09% 1.48% 4.71% 0.1633
TABLE 4.3. Effects of heterogeneity on the market proportion of asset
2 (pim,2), market volatility (σ(r˜m)), market risk-premium (E(r˜m− rf )),
the risk-free rate (rf ) and the Sharpe ratio
E(r˜m)−rf
σm
for the three cases,
compared with the benchmark homogeneous case.
We redo the numerical analysis in Table 4.1 for the four cases and present the results
in Table 4.3. The interesting cases (i) Case 1 when (∆, δ, ε, α) = (−0.2, 0, 0, 0.1) and
(ii) Case 2 when (∆, δ, ε, α) = (0, 0.2, 0, 0.1). In both the cases, there is a significant
increase in market risk premium and reduction in risk-free rate. Now we provide some
explanations for these results. For (i), we have α∆ < 0, suggesting that there is a
positive correlation between the risk-tolerant and pessimism. This leads the aggregate
market to perceiving a lower expected return for asset 2 (see (4.2)), therefore invest-
ing more into asset 1 (risky stock), driving up the aggregate market expected return
and volatility. However, in contrast with Case 1 in Table 4.1, here the risk-free also
6Basically, we swap the two risky assets and still consider the biased beliefs in the second asset.
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reduces significantly because the market is pessimistic about expected equity returns
overall (whereas in Case 1, market was optimistic about expected equity returns), thus
more willing to invest in the risk-free security. In (ii), the aggregate market becomes
pessimistic about future return for both asset (see (4.12)) since αδ > 0 (the more
optimistic agent is less confident). As a result, the market is even more willing to
invest in the risk-free security than in the case (i), thus the reduction in risk-free rate
is greater in this case. Therefore, the combined effect of heterogeneity in the beliefs
of the expected and variance of terminal return leads to the most desirable result of a
low risk-free rate and high market risk premium. This case also produces the highest
Sharpe ratio amongst all the cases considered.
5. CONCLUSION
Heterogeneity, reflecting diversity and disagreement, among investors in financial
markets is very common and it has significant impact on the market. Within the stan-
dard mean variance framework, we examine the impact of the heterogeneity, in par-
ticular the risk tolerance, optimism/pessimism and confidence/dobut, on the market
equilibrium. To make an explicit analysis, we consider a market with two heteroge-
neous agents, two risky assets and a risk-free asset, in which agents have different risk
tolerance and agree on the expected return and standard deviation of one asset but not
the other. Agents can also be biased on the return correlation. By assuming hetero-
geneity and bounded rationality of investors, we characterize the market equilibrium
through a consensus belief and the boundedly rational equilibrium.
By considering mean-preserved spreads in agents’ preference and different aspects
of the biased beliefs, we obtain some analytical results on the joint impact of the risk
tolerance, optimism/pessimism, and confidence/doubt on the market equilibrium, risk
premium of the risky assets, market portfolio, and the risk-free rate. We derive the
CAPM relation under the heterogeneous beliefs, in which the heterogeneity becomes
a risk factor of the systematic risk of the risky assets. However, this risk factor can be
either positive or negative, depending on the correlations among the risk tolerance, op-
timism/pessimism, and confidence/doubt, and the nature of the stock on which agents
disagree. We show that on the one hand, when agents disagree on and have biased
beliefs in the risky stock, positive correlations between either risk tolerance and op-
timism/doubt or pessimism and doubt can explain the equity premium and risk-free
rate puzzles, but the amount of pessimism and doubt provides only a rather small im-
provement in the puzzles, which is consistent with the survey data. However, when the
optimistic agent believes in higher return correlation (comparing with the pessimistic
agent believes in lower return correlation), it provides the most promising explanation
on the puzzles and the amount of the changes in resolving the puzzles are significant.
This clearly indicates the important role played by the disagreement in the asset return
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correlation, which has not been explored in the literature. On the other hand, when
agents disagree on and have biased beliefs in the safe stock, positive correlations be-
tween either the risk tolerance and optimism or pessimism and doubt provide the most
promising explanations on the puzzles. In particular, the amount of pessimism and
doubt provides a significant improvement in the puzzles. In this case, the biased belief
in the return correlation provides little explanation on the puzzles.
The biased beliefs may depend on the market conditions. Intuitively, there may be
more disagreement on the risky stocks when markets are moving upwards and on the
safe stocks when markets are moving downwards. The empirical implications of the
results obtained in this paper would be of very interesting. The disagreement in this
paper is characterized by mean preserved spreads about a benchmark homogeneous
belief. It would also be interesting to extend the analysis to situations with skewed
distribution about the heterogeneous beliefs such as in Abel (2002). In addition, ex-
tension to a dynamical model to examine the profitability and survivability of agents
with different beliefs and the impact on the market would be interesting. We leave
these to future research.
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